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Abstract
Since the late 1970s, the developed welfare states of the European Union have been recasting
the policy mix on which their systems of social protection were built. They have adopted a new
policy orthodoxy that could be summarised as the ‘social investment strategy’. Here we trace its
origins and major developments. The shift is characterised by a move away from passive transfers
and towards the maximalisation of employability and employment, but there are significant
national distinctions and regime specific trajectories. We discuss some caveats, focusing on the
question whether the new policy paradigm has been established at the expense of social policies
that mitigate poverty and inequality.
Introduction
To a significant extent, welfare states have been adjusted to new economic and
social demands. Moreover, they seem to have adopted, albeit with considerable
variation, a new policy orthodoxy, summarised as the ‘social investment strategy’.
This strategy can best be characterised as one
that aims at simultaneously promoting competitiveness and growth, employment and quality
of jobs. It is essentially about resolving the trade-off between efficiency and equality. Achieving
this goal is depend[e]nt on how credible policies can be formulated and delivered. Different
examples of best practices can be identified that help to simultaneously widen the tax-base,
increase fertility, fight poverty and inequality, or improve the financial sustainability of certain
key programmes such as pension schemes. (Morel et al., 2009: 10)
How and to what extent has the social investment perspective been adopted
in different welfare states? Our thesis is that the key conviction that the European
welfare states have to be transformed from passive benefit machines into
social investment states stands out as a powerful policy paradigm supported,
intriguingly, by governments of various ideological persuasions.
The extent to which the idea of social investment and the need to foster
human capital has become the core of policy paradigms virtually everywhere in
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Europe can perhaps already be read from the prominent place these concerns
have had since the European Union Lisbon Summit in 2000. Certainly, the targets
of the Lisbon strategy have not been met. But the conviction that the social
investment strategy is the best possible route for welfare state adjustment and
the expectation that in the longer run this will pay off in terms of economic and
social achievements, is still, by and large and in spite of the financial and economic
crisis, intact. Having said this, one can indicate instantly two major dangers for
the social investment strategy: the expected aftershocks of the economic crisis
(Hemerijck et al., 2009) and the political vulnerability of a strategy of which the
benefits are expected to transpire in the longer run.
However, our analysis of welfare state trajectories reveals that the European
welfare states have been following a social investment logic in their reform
agendas. This social investment approach is geared towards ensuring that the
returns to social expenditures are maximised, in the form of active employment
and social participation − especially in the labour market − social cohesion
and stability. From a social investment perspective, welfare states are expected to
help non-working people back into employment, to complement income from
employment for the working poor, to enable parents reconcile career and family
life, to promote gender equality, to support child development and to provide
social services for an ageing society (Jenson, 2006). ‘The announced goals of the
social investment perspective’, Jenson (2009: 27) argues:
are to increase social inclusion and minimise the intergenerational transfer of poverty as
well as to ensure that the population is well prepared for the likely employment conditions
(demand for higher educational qualifications; less job security; more precarious forms of
employment) of contemporary economies. Doing so will allow individuals and families to
maintain responsibility for their well-being via market incomes and intra-family exchanges,
as well as lessening the threats to social protection regimes coming from ageing societies and
high dependency ratios . . . In policy terms this implies increased attention to and investment
in children, human capital and making work pay.
We trace the origins and major developments of the social investment
strategy, describe its main features and variations and show how and to what
extent it has inspired an important transformation of social policies and helped
build a new welfare state edifice. In the conclusion, we discuss whether the new
policy paradigm and the accompanying retrenchment in certain social policy
fields have been established at the expense of more traditional income protection
policies, with unfavorable effects on poverty relief and income equality.
A bird’s eye view of welfare state reform and innovation
Judging by a host of studies on welfare state reform in the last decade (Hemerijck
and Schludi, 2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Hemerijck, 2002; Clasen, 2005;
Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Ellison, 2006; Bonoli and Palier, 2007; Leibfried
and Mau, 2008; Starke, 2008; Stiller, 2010; Palier, 2010; Vis, 2010), the idea that the
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welfare state – and especially the continental, Bismarckian type of welfare state –
is a massive and expensive construction that is impossible to modify has been
abandoned. Such studies document that the static representation of a ‘frozen’
welfare state landscape has not done justice to the striking intensity and the
comprehensive character of permanent reform. In fact, these studies show that
the literature of the 1990s has greatly exaggerated the extent to which institutional
sclerosis and welfare state resilience characterised the various worlds of welfare.
The European welfare states have never been the ‘static’ models that the
institutionalist literature of the 1990s portrayed them to be. Surely, change over
time has been slow and path dependent to a large extent, as a result of a political
and institutional constellation that favoured the status quo (Pierson, 2001). But
comparative assessments need to be made in a diachronic and dynamic way
and need to take into account that the effects of the welfare state reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s frequently were not noticeable until after a decade or more.
In fact, many such reforms were actually intended to produce delayed effects.
Politically, many reforms, for example old-age and disability pension reforms,
aimed to spare existing core constituencies and to transfer the costs to new groups.
Institutionally, far-reaching reforms are almost always time-intensive processes
that have long incubation periods before they start to pay off, for instance in
terms of job creation and efforts to increase labour market participation. The
mistake was that ‘slowness’ and piecemeal change were interpreted as signs for
the absence of change.
Interpreting the welfare state as covering more than social protection, we
observe a broad, permanent and cumulatively transformative process of policy
change across a number of intimately related policy areas over the last three
decades (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Hemerijck and Schludi, 2000; Ferrera and
Hemerijck, 2003). These changes are noticeable in all European welfare states,
albeit with significant variations.
In macroeconomic policy, up to the late 1970s, Keynesian macroeconomic
policy priorities, geared toward full employment as a principal goal of economic
management, prevailed. In the face of stagflation – that is, the combination of high
inflation and rising unemployment – the Keynesian order gave way to a stricter
macroeconomic policy framework centred on economic stability, hard curren-
cies, low inflation, sound budgets and debt reduction, culminating in the intro-
duction of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The introduction of the single
currency turned monetary policy into a fixed parameter for policy reform in other
fields, excluding, for instance, meddling with exchange rates and forcing partici-
pating governments to seek opportunities for welfare state adjustment elsewhere.
The financial crisis, however, has induced governments to intervene
massively in the banking system; sound budgeting has been put into place
to bail out the banks and to prevent the economy from getting caught in a
downward spiral. The political struggles revolve around the question whether
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to opt for Keynesian inspired policy options to compensate for the impact of
the likely aftershocks (rising unemployment, declining value of pension assets)
or to return to the strict macroeconomic framework that stresses retrenchment
policies necessary to balance the public budgets that before the outbreak of the
financial crisis were already under strain (Starke, 2008; Hemerijck et al., 2009;
Vis and van Kersbergen, 2011).
In the field of wage policy, a reorientation took place from the 1980s onwards
in favour of market-based wage restraint in the face of intensified economic
internationalisation. In the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark, for instance, the
rediscovery of a jobs-intensive growth path was built on social pacts. Likewise,
in the 1990s, the EMU entrance exam played a critical role in the resurgence of
national social pacts for the hard-currency latecomers Italy, Portugal, and Greece
(Fajertag and Pochet, 2000; Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000). The financial crisis,
however, is putting such societal pacts under strain, because the need for fiscal
consolidation either leads to painful cuts in the welfare state or to an increase in
taxes and contributions, and therefore to an increased popular demand to make
up, at least partly, for the resulting loss of income and social protection.
In the area of labour market policy, in the 1990s the new objective became
maximising employment rather than trying to ease stress on the labour market
by inducing (early) exit, and this implied new links between employment policy
and social security. The greater the number of people participating in the labour
market, the greater the contribution they make to the affordability of adequate
levels of social protection. The novelty of the new approach lies in the combination
of investment in human capital and stronger work incentives (Bonoli, 2009: 56–
7). In all countries (except Italy), we see an increase in active labour market
policies, although some countries stress human capital investment (the Nordic
countries and France), while others emphasise facilitating labour market re-
entry (The Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom). There is, however,
some convergence in that most countries adjust their operational policies (Van
Berkel, 2010) and focus on either training or removing obstacles to participation,
in addition to providing strong work incentives. Bonoli (2009: 64) expects that
the current economic crisis, with longer spells of unemployment, implies the
ineffectiveness of work incentives, reinforcing the need for human capital policies
(avoiding human capital depletion; upskilling) and job creation.
With respect to labour market regulation, empirical evidence from Denmark
and the Netherlands suggest that ‘flexicure’ systems, which are based on
minimal job protection but also offer decent standards of social protection
for the unemployed, are best able to bridge the gap between insiders and
outsiders. However, to the extent that such policies are predominantly aimed
at deregulating labour markets at the margins (e.g. temporary work), there is
the risk that they will reinforce the divide between insiders and outsiders (Palier,
2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012). At the same time, however, it is doubtful whether
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the flexicurity model enjoys sufficient support in society (especially among
rank-and-file union members) to guarantee its continuation in the context of
growing budget deficits and continuing problems of the financial sector (Gazier,
2008, 2009). Especially in Denmark, the flexicurity model has come under strain
as a result of the comparatively low growth rates, the cumulative negative growth
rate over 2008 and 2009 of 6.4 per cent and the steady rise of unemployment.
At the time of writing (May, 2011), the standardised unemployment rate
(March 2011) amounted to 7.9 per cent, compared to 6.3 per cent in Germany
and 4.2 per cent in the Netherlands (figures are taken from Eurostat:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/, accessed
18 May 2011). Also, the financial crisis and its economic aftermath have made
stricter employment protection and subsidised internal flexibility more popular
(Auer, 2010).
Within the sphere of social insurance, the changes in macroeconomic
management, wage policy and labour market conditions have resulted in a shift
from passive policy priorities aimed at income maintenance towards a greater
emphasis on reintegration, also captured by the shift from out-of-work benefits to
in-work benefits. At the same time, policy makers in many countries have turned
towards strengthening the minimum income protection function of the welfare
state, coupled with activation and reintegration measures to ensure minimum
standards of self-reliance. Retrenchment has also been high on the policy agenda
and has been moving up the priority list now that governments have started to try
to balance their budgets again. There have been reductions in benefit levels and
benefit duration, the eligibility criteria of social provisions have been tightened
and the coverage of benefits have been limited. Taking average net (after taxes)
replacement rates for unemployment insurance and sick pay as our indicator for
retrenchment, we observe that all welfare states retrench (Starke, 2008; Vis, 2010:
54). However, the extent of retrenchment should not be exaggerated, because
some countries lower their replacement rates, but keep them at a high level,
while others increase benefits. If we look at the gross unemployment benefits as
a percentage of previous earnings in Table 1, we observe that all types of welfare
states (‘regimes’) retrench in the period 1997–2007. One representative of the
liberal type, the United Kingdom, retrenches quite plainly its already low rate.
Yet, in the same period Ireland raises its unemployment benefit. In the social
democratic countries, we see a similarly diverse trajectory, with Sweden raising
replacement rates and Denmark lowering them. The conservative regime also
is stable, although the Dutch hybrid case stands out, with a reduction of the
unemployment benefit replacement rate from 52.2 to 33.9 per cent.
Late entry into the labour market of young people, early exit of older workers,
together with higher life expectancy and low fertility confronts many welfare
systems with a looming pension financing deficit. In the area of old-age pensions,
retrenchment is high on the agenda. But retrenchment is just one side of the story
480 kees van kersbergen and anton hemerijck
TABLE 1. Unemployment benefits, 1997
and 2007 (gross replacement rates as a
percentage of previous gross earnings)
1997 2007
Australia 26.5 20.2
Canada 14.9 11.7
Ireland 29.0 37.2
New Zealand 31.8 25.5
UK 18.3 12.1
US 13.9 13.6
Average LR 22.4 20.5
Austria 32.3 31.6
Belgium 39.7 40.0
France 36.5 39.0
Germany 25.7 23.7
Italy 18.0 31.7
Netherlands 52.2 33.9
Switzerland 33.8 32.7
Average CR 34.0 32.3
Denmark 62.5 47.7
Finland 34.2 34.1
Norway 38.6 33.6
Sweden 26.9 32.4
Average SDR 40.6 37.0
Note: LR = liberal regime; CR = conservative
regime; SDR = social democratic regime
Source: OECD 2010,
see http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,
en_2649_39023495_43221014_1_1_1_1,00.html
of what is a genuine restructuring and adaptation to demographic, economic
and social structural change of pension systems (Ha¨usermann, 2010). Some
important trends concern the growth of (compulsory) occupational and private
pensions and the development of multi-pillar systems, combining pay-as-you-
go and fully funded methods, with relatively tight (actuarial) links between the
pension benefits and contributions (Clark and Whiteside, 2003; Immergut et al.,
2007). In addition, measures to combine work and retirement, with tax allowances
and partial pension benefits, have been introduced in countries such as Denmark
and Finland.
Social serviceshave experienced a strong comeback. Spending (as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product, GDP) on childcare, education, health, and elderly
care, next to training and employment services, have increased practically
everywhere in the European Union over the past decade. As the future of welfare
states depends on how well the dilemmas associated with women’s new career
preferences are solved (Esping-Andersen, 2009), it is impossible to imagine
a positive equilibrium without an effective reconciliation of family functions
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(Hakim, 2003; Orloff, 2006). Leave arrangements are being expanded, in terms
of both time and scope of coverage, also to include care for the frail elderly. In
addition, under conditions of the availability of good-quality child care, female
employment is the key to resolving child poverty (Esping-Andersen, 2009: 124),
which is on the rise in most European countries.
In terms of the financial architecture of the welfare state, we observe an
increase in user financing in the areas of child care, old-age care and medical
care. With respect to taxation, as a result of intensified competition across the
European Union, many EU Member States started to pursue a combination
strategy of lower statutory tax rates and a broadening of the tax base.
As regards macroeconomic performance, we observe a remarkable
convergence in terms of price stability and fiscal consolidation. There is a
similar cross-national convergence in unit labour costs. Expenditure levels on
social protection (as a percentage of GDP) have remained relatively stable.
With respect to employment, there has been a large measure of convergence
since the 1990s, with practically all welfare regimes scoring somewhere between
65 per cent and 75 per cent activity. This convergent trend is even stronger for the
‘prime age’ (25–54) group of adult workers. There has also been a general increase
in activity rates among older workers in some continental welfare states, most
notably the Netherlands, followed by France and Belgium. For younger cohorts,
female employment in Southern and continental Europe is catching up rapidly
to Northern European averages. Today high-skilled groups surpass the Lisbon
benchmark of 70 per cent by about 15 percentage points, independently of welfare
regime characteristics. In comparison to this group, it is the low skilled whose
labour market opportunities are seriously weakened.
National and regime specifics
Against the background of these general trends, it is important to highlight
significant national distinctions and trajectories.
The Nordic welfare states offer generous income guarantees, a wide range
of public social services and active labour market policies aimed at maximising
employment for men and women. We focus on Denmark as an example. The
liberal welfare states rely on relatively modest, often means-tested benefits for
unemployment, sickness and old-age, with strict rules for social assistance. Here
we specifically look at the United Kingdom. The continental welfare states rely on
relatively high income replacement benefits, linked to the claimant’s employment
history and family situation. Germany is our example, but we also pay attention
to the hybrid but important reform case of the Netherlands.
Nordic ‘dual-earner’ post-industrialism and the case of Denmark
The most conspicuous characteristic of the Nordic regime has been its
combination of generous income maintenance benefits, well-developed public
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social services and active labour market policies, which sustain high participation
rates for both men and women. Social services not only provide large-scale and
often flexible employment opportunities in the public sector, but also decent jobs
for modestly skilled workers. Publicly funded higher education and vocational
training foster innovation and increased productivity in the high-tech sector,
which in turn provide employment opportunities in private sector skilled work.
The cost, of course, is a very high tax rate. In addition, the Nordic model is under
constant pressure to keep balanced budgets, especially in the wake of European
monetary integration.
Still, the performance of the Nordic regime, in spite of all difficulties and
political criticisms, is remarkable. Not only were the Nordic countries capable
of recovering from monetary and economic crises, they also managed to restore
balanced budgets and economic dynamism, while maintaining high employment
levels and low poverty rates (cf. Ryner, 2007: 66). One important reason for this
is that the Nordic welfare states were already well prepared for the ‘new social
risks’ of post-industrial society (Bonoli, 2007), socialising the risks associated
with aging societies, changing household structures and the transition to the
knowledge economy. In line with its normative foundation in a productivist
work ethic, the social investment strategy comes clearly to the fore as the Nordic
regime is moving even further away from passively compensating unemployment
to actively promoting employability.
The presence of basic income guarantees is a safeguard not only against
poverty and exclusion, but also against the penalties deriving from spells out
of work and broken or composite careers. The availability of a wide array of
services allows Nordic welfare states to respond more effectively to the care
needs of families and to socialise their costs, including the cost of children.
Moreover, high rates of labour-market participation alleviate the financial strains
on pension systems. Furthermore, the Nordic countries invest heavily in labour
market training (a crucial policy for knowledge-intensive economies) and their
education expenditure ratios are the highest in Europe. Investment in training
and labour market activation has increased so as to balance out a move to a
more individualised, less-redistributive pension system. Sweden, Denmark and
Finland spent between 0.3 and 0.5 per cent of GDP on labour market training
and 0.2–0.3 per cent of GDP on re-entry facilitation (Bonoli, 2009: 61).
The Danes have gone furthest in the social investment strategy, particularly
with respect to activation policies. A series of labour market reforms in the
1990s gradually implemented a right and a duty to activation. This included the
introduction of mandatory, individual action plans that activate the unemployed
within three to five months and the abolishment of a system that passively
accorded generous benefits (Albrechtsen, 2004: 224). The repertoire of active
labour market policies was expanded and jobseekers received earlier and better
access to publicly subsidised employment opportunities, education and training
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measures, rehabilitation courses, as well as sheltered employment for persons
with permanently reduced working capacities. In addition to these supply-
side measures, a number of leave schemes were temporarily used to reduce
artificially the demand for work during the 1990s. It was the introduction of
these ‘active’ elements into the Danish labour market that gave rise to the
flexicurity model. This model triangulates ‘flexible labour markets, generous
unemployment benefits, and active labour market policies – all coordinated to
reduce unemployment and improve the quality and supply of workers to the
labour market’ (Campbell and Hall, 2006: 30; see also Madsen, 2006). The
1990s also witnessed the expansion of services for children and the elderly,
the expansion of parental leave opportunities and the introduction of specific
activation instruments for mothers returning to work. These policies were
targeted at improving the working opportunities for women and were coupled to
the creation of 50,000 public sector jobs between 1995 and 2001 (Dingeldey, 2005).
Alongside the introduction of these enabling activation measures, the
eligibility criteria for social assistance were tightened. In 1990, the government
introduced Denmark’s first compulsory activation measure, requiring eighteen-
and nineteen-year-old social assistance claimants to participate in a youth
allowance scheme in return for social assistance payments. Subsequently,
compulsory activation measures were gradually expanded to reach all social
assistance recipients, timetables were tightened and participants in municipal
activation schemes no longer (re-)qualified for unemployment benefits. The
duration of unemployment benefits was gradually reduced. However, with the
exception of young people with no qualifying education, generosity did not
decline. In addition, the so-called ‘passive period’ without the right and duty to
activation was reduced sequentially from four years in 1990 to six months for
under-thirty jobseekers and nine months for adult jobseekers in 2007 (Kvist et al.,
2008: 227). In this way, Denmark adopted a ‘work first’ approach, emphasising
benefit control, availability tests and job guidance.
The liberal way and the British case
The UK has been taking a new tack roughly in line with the social investment
paradigm, albeit it with clear liberal traits. Still, activation policies have been
widely expanded to strengthen the market economy, while trying not to increase
poverty. The activation policy moves away from passive, means-tested schemes
towards in-work benefits.
Since 1997, successive British governments have departed from the strictly
liberal path by developing a liberal version of the idea of social investment,
the so-called ‘enabling’ welfare state (Gilbert, 2004) that makes most of its
provisions contingent upon paid employment (see Clasen, 2005; Hills et al.,
2009) and balances rights and responsibilities. The flagship example has been
the introduction of the New Deal in 1998. The New Deal partly built on the
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requirement that the unemployed actively seek work in exchange for benefits.
The New Deal envisioned a new labour market policy that would offer the
unemployed efficient job centres, more personalised support services and core
skills training such as literacy, numeracy and self-presentation (Weishaupt, 2010).
For this purpose, the government sought to offer training or jobs to
250,000 young people, spending more than £3 billion on young people alone
(http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/budget97/hmt2.html). Accordingly, by
far the largest New Deal program has been the New Deal for Young People.
It offers four options to the unemployed: subsidised employment in the private
sector; subsidised and temporary work in the voluntary or environmental sectors;
full-time education; or training. There is, however, no ‘fifth option’ of passively
living on benefits, and failure to comply with the rules can lead to a loss of benefits
and eventual suspension. The scheme has been extended to unemployed adults
and additional target groups, such as lone parents, chronically disabled persons
and older workers.
Another pillar of the ‘make work pay’ strategy concerned a relatively generous
Working Families Tax Credit in October 1999. Rewarding those in work through
an almost ten-fold increase in tax credits, it sky-rocketed from £1.4 billion in
1999 to £11.5 billion in 2004 (Nachtwey and Heise, 2006: 6). It has subsequently
been extended to adults without children and, if applicable, also covers parts
of childcare costs. Taken together, the tax credits and minimum wage have had
the result that anyone working at least thirty hours a week received an income
above the poverty line (Bru¨cker and Konle-Seidl, 2006: 5). Moreover, a variety
of legislation was initiated to promote the reconciliation of work and family life
(more childcare places, paid maternity leave, a leave entitlement for fathers and
an extension of flexible working time (Clasen, 2005)).
Tackling Britain’s occupational skills deficit also became part of the social
investment agenda. An essential part of Britain’s skills strategy has been the
introduction of instruments intended to improve the qualifications of less-skilled
workers. The ‘Train to Gain’ scheme offers less-skilled workers fully paid access
to training and offered employers subsidies to compensate for the loss in working
time (Page and Hillage, 2006). In 2006, a legal right for adults to obtain a certain
level of qualifications free of tuition was introduced (Weishaupt, 2010). As part
of an overhaul of the apprentice system, age limits for publicly funded places
were removed, a new program for fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds still at school
introduced, pre-apprenticeships made available, and access to apprenticeships
for older workers significantly expanded.
Reversing the continental syndrome of ‘welfare without work’
and the German and Dutch cases
The continental welfare state has been described as a ‘welfare without
work’ system (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Historically, the prevalence of Christian
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‘familialism’ encouraged women to stay home rather than to participate in the
labour market and induced a high family wage for male breadwinners (Van
Kersbergen, 1995). High wages, in turn, reduced employment creation, especially
in the area of low-productivity and low-skill services. Aggravating matters,
industrial restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s was accommodated through a
major expansion of early retirement schemes, catalysing those labour-shedding
inclinations already connected with globalisation and deindustrialisation. The
resulting self-reinforcing negative spiral has had a heavy impact on less-skilled
workers, the young and women. Budgetary pressures for retrenching popular and
generous income replacement schemes contrast sharply with new demands for
social protection, resulting from both the decline of traditional family structures
and failure to expand public and private service sectors.
This continental syndrome has generated a complex reform agenda:
containing social spending by trimming ‘passive’ benefits, introducing ‘active’
incentives in other cash benefits, expanding childcare and parental leave,
increasing means-tested benefits and reducing payroll charges. However, the
continental welfare states, because they were very much disconnected from the
idea of social investment, probably have undergone the most dramatic and path-
breaking reforms in their adoption of the social investment paradigm.
Expanding employment levels among women, low-skill groups and older
workers was seen as a sine qua non for the long-term sustainability of the
welfare state. As a result, most continental welfare states have been increasing
spending on active labour market policy. Higher pressures on the unemployed to
accept suitable job offers or participate in education have strengthened activation
programs. Since the early 1990s, steps have been taken to reduce early exit via
tightened eligibility criteria, benefit reductions, stricter controls and, in the early
2000s, the abolishment of early retirement schemes altogether.
De facto the continental welfare states are saying farewell to the traditional
family ideal and opting for reforms that enable women to participate in the
labour market. Parental leave schemes were expanded and care for the frail
elderly and sick children was introduced. Childcare has expanded since the late
1990s in particular (Morgan, 2009: 47). Governments have increased spending
and pushed for more flexible childcare facility opening hours in order to enlarge
the number of available and affordable childcare places, although this has not
gone so far as to indicate a commitment to a ‘service state’ (Morgan, 2009: 52).
Still, also on the Continent, activation programs based on individual
guidance and training opportunities, primarily targeting ‘outsiders’ like the
young, female or low-skilled workers, have gained momentum over the past
two decades. These reforms have begun shifting privileges away from insiders
(male breadwinners and their dependents) by opening insurance benefits to
outsiders, introducing paid maternity leave and improving social rights for part-
time workers and minimum income protection.
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Until the mid-1990s, the German welfare state was infamous for its
disinclination to radical reform (Bo¨nker and Wollmann, 2001; Obinger and
Starke, 2007; Stiller, 2010). Since then, however, it has made a dramatic turn
towards activation. In 2001, for instance, the Job-AQTIV Act expanded public
employment and opened up broad, early access to training programs. In 2004 and
2005, the influential Hartz reforms expanded the low-wage sector through new tax
and contribution exemptions and reductions. While most measures were related
to active labour market policies, the most controversial elements brought major
changes to unemployment policy. These changes involved drastically shortening
benefits durations for all unemployed, most recently also including the long-
term unemployed with disabilities (Rauch and Dornette, 2010), hiking the early
retirement age for elderly unemployed from sixty to sixty-three, tightening
requirements to accept suitable jobs, simplifying insurance regulations, and
merging unemployment assistance with social assistance. The latter implies
that only those unemployed who fulfil certain qualifying conditions are entitled
indefinitely.
Whereas such reforms addressed the changing skill requirements of the
German labour market, a second strand of reforms tackled the post-industrial
social risks associated with the massive entry of women into paid employment.
To help reconcile work and family life, childcare and parental leave arrangements
were expanded. Leave schemes came to include part-time workers and to offer
two ‘daddy months’ for working fathers and quadrupled the maximum working
benefits of the late 1990s. In addition, all-day childcare facilities for children under
the age of three have been expanded (Morgan, 2009).
In contrast to Germany, the Dutch welfare state of the 1990s was widely
praised for its recovery from a severe inactivity crisis in the 1980s and for managing
to do so without suspending minimum income protection. This development
was based on a long-term strategy of organised wage restraint, restriction of
access to (and curtailing heavy misuse of), disability pensions and sickness
insurance and promotion of part-time work (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). In 1995,
agreements between the social partners struck a winning balance between flexible
employment afforded by safeguarding social security and the legal position of
part-time and temporary workers, in exchange for a slight loosening of employee
dismissal legislation (flexicurity). The 2000 Working Hours Act now gives part-
timers an explicit right to equal treatment in all areas negotiated by the social
partners (Hemerijck, 2003).
Between 2003 and 2006, the Netherlands took major steps to bolster activity
rates, and, as in Germany, policy makers opted for both carrots and sticks. As of
2004, older unemployed people are required to look for work and employers are
no longer obliged to pay premiums for disabled employees aged over fifty-five.
In 2005, the government significantly reduced disability benefits for partially
disabled individuals who do not work, but also expanded training opportunities
two decades of change in europe 487
and created wage subsidies for partially disabled workers and their employers.
Also, tax benefits for pre-pension schemes were replaced by a life course scheme
that stimulates employees to accrue 210 per cent of their annual salary by saving
a yearly maximum of 12 per cent of their annual income. This enables employees
to receive 70 per cent of their annual salary while away on leave (parental,
educational, sabbatical or early retirement) for three years. In order to further
reconcile work and family life, those using the life course scheme during periods
of parental leave are granted an additional payment worth 50 per cent of the
minimum wage. Furthermore, since 2005 additional child care facilities were
created at schools and were subsidised. Still, in terms of participation in formal
childcare (2008), especially of children not yet three years old, the Netherlands
remains a laggard (www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database).
In sum, the continental welfare states have transformed more considerably
than have their Nordic and liberal counterparts. The adoption of the idea
of social investment required the adjustment of the two core policy values
of the continental welfare state: status maintenance in social policy and
support for the traditional family. In their stead came the promotion of equal
opportunities via labour market participation and poverty reduction. We observe
a development towards an activating welfare state that enhances the social rights
and employability of women and low-skill groups in particular.
Conclusion and discussion
In many respects, everywhere in Europe, the social investment strategy has
informed the reform of the welfare state. Although to a large extent many of
the adjustments have depended on the varied starting points of the different
regimes, there have also been quite radical, path-breaking reforms towards the
activating welfare state, especially in the continental welfare cluster, that perhaps
challenge the standard classification of welfare states according to regime types.
Without much exaggeration, we can conclude that the idea of social investment
has established itself as the foundation of a new policy paradigm and that
its translation into new social policies has been quite successful. Surely, as we
indicated, social policy retrenchment is part of the story of two decades of social
policy change, but it is only that: part of the story. The other part is the surprisingly
widespread and startlingly successful adoption of the social investment agenda
in most if not all European welfare states.
If we look at employment patterns and trajectories, the impact of the
activation side of the new social investment logic clearly comes to the fore. To give
one telling example: in 1985, the female employment rate in the Netherlands was
still a low 40 per cent, while the German figure was below 50 per cent. By 2009,
however, the Netherlands with 71.5 per cent not only had caught up with many
other countries, but also had surpassed Germany (66.2 per cent) and Sweden
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(70.2) (Eurostat, 2011a). Surely, in the Netherlands part-time employment (both
for men and women) is relatively high, but this, in a sense, is the specific way in
which the activation side of the social investment strategy has played out in that
country. One other telling indicator, especially for the continental regime, is that
the average exit age from the labour force has been increasing since the late 1990s
(Eurostat, 2011b).
The question we need to raise at this point, however, is whether and to what
extent the successful adoption of the social investment paradigm has led to a
relative neglect of social policies that are designed for social risks that are difficult
to cover with activation type policies. In particular, could it be that there has
been a trade-off between social investment strategies that stimulate job growth
and redistributive policies that mitigate inequality?
We have witnessed a U-turn in the development of income inequality:
declining in the post-war period until roughly the late 1970s, then suddenly
increasing. Inequality has continued to increase since then, while the risk of
poverty has hardly declined, if at all (OECD, 2008). The critical question is
whether rising inequality has been directly caused by the transformation of the
welfare state according to the social investment logic. The answer is probably
no, if only because inequality started growing long before major welfare reforms
were carried out. Moreover, there are other dynamics at work in the complex
field of incomes distribution, of which the globalisation- and technology-driven
increasing demand for (highly) skilled workers and the ensuing growing wage
dispersion between unskilled and skilled workers is but one example. Still,
increasing wage differentials and the decreasing redistributive capacity of taxes
and benefits are held co-responsible for increasing inequality (Brandolini and
Smeeding, 2009).
Also, we should not overestimate the impact that the welfare state has had on
inequality in the first place. To a large extent, the dramatic increase in equality in
the first decades after the Second World War was the result of growing productivity
of low-skilled labour that made incomes grow faster at the bottom than at the
top. The increase in income inequality, as the OECD (2008) has highlighted, is
mainly due to the top of the income distribution faring much better than the
middle and the bottom.
At the same time, however, we should not underestimate the welfare state’s
impact on inequality either. It is difficult to estimate precisely the impact of the
welfare state on inequality. The reason is that we need to have information about
the world, say the primary income distribution, before it is affected by welfare
state intervention, so as to be able to estimate the outcome after intervention.
The problem is that the welfare state is always already directly implicated in the
primary income distribution (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009: 639).
We conclude that activation and the emergence of the social investment
state have been relatively successful in terms of stimulating labour market
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participation, but also that social inequality has been on the rise. Moreover,
the risk of poverty in the EU-15 countries (the percentage of people living below
the poverty line of 60 per cent of the median income) varied between 15 and
17 per cent in the period 2000–2010. It is unclear what the impact of the social
investment strategy has been or is likely to have on income distribution and
poverty. Flexible labour markets tend to increase wage differentials and activation
policy is designed for the employable or to raise employability. In a word, the
logic of social investment is focused on maximising the chances of earning an
income on the labour market, and the market tends to generate inequalities and
risks.
If the social investment strategy remains coupled with minimum wages,
education, training and skills upgrading, one could envision an increase in
equality of opportunity and a decrease in income inequality. The crucial issue,
however, is whether the financial crisis and its economic aftershocks have
been undermining conditions to such an extent that it has become precarious
whether social investment policies keep the ability to perform satisfactorily.
For instance, will flexicurity policies continue to offer the kind of positive-
sum solutions even if temporary and other atypical jobs are disappearing,
unemployment is rising and public budgets are hard to control? Whether the
social investment strategy will survive the aftershocks of the financial crisis,
including potentially long-term low economic growth rates, remains an open
question.
References
Albrechtsen, H. (2004), ‘Active young people in Europe’, in A. S. Pascual (ed.), Are Activation
Policies Converging in Europe? The European Employment Strategy for Young People,
Brussels: ETUI, pp. 197–252.
Armingeon, K. and Bonoli, G. (2006), The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting
Post-War Social Policies to New Social Risks, London: Routledge.
Auer, P. (2010), ‘What’s in a name? The rise (and fall?) of flexicurity’, Journal of Industrial
Relations, 52: 3, 371–86.
Bo¨nker, F. and Wollman, H. (1996), ‘Incrementalism and reform waves: the case of social service
reform in the Federal Republic of Germany’, Journal of European Public Policy, 3: 3, 441–60.
Bonoli, G. (2007), ‘Time matters: postindustrialization, new social risks, and welfare state
adaptation in advanced industrial democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 40: 5, 495–
520.
Bonoli, G. (2009), ‘Varieties of social investment in labour market policy’, in N. Morel, B. Palier
and J. Palme (eds.), What Future for Social Investment?, Stockholm: Institute for Future
Studies, pp. 55–66.
Bonoli, G. and Palier, B. (2007), ‘When past reforms open new opportunities: comparing old
age insurance reforms in Bismarckian welfare systems’, Social Policy and Administration,
41: 6, 555–73.
Brandolini, A. and Smeeding, T. M. (2009), ‘Income inequality in richer and OECD countries’,
in W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic
Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–100.
Bru¨cker, H. and Konle-Seidl, R. (2006), ‘Kombilo¨hne im internationalen Vergleich: Nicht jede
Therapie schla¨gt u¨berall an’, IAB-Kurzbericht, 10 (8.6.2006), 1–8.
490 kees van kersbergen and anton hemerijck
Campbell, J. L. and Hall, J. A. (2006), ‘Introduction: the state of Denmark’, in J. L. Campbell and
J. A. Hall (eds.), National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience,
Montreal: McGill University Press, pp. 3–49.
Clark, G. L. and Whiteside, N. (2003), Pension Security in the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Clasen, J. (2005), Reforming European Welfare States: Germany and the United Kingdom
Compared, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dingeldey, I. (2005), ‘Welfare state transformation between workfare and an enabling state: a
comparative analysis’, TranState Working Papers, No. 21, Collaborative Research Center
597: Transformations of the State, University of Bremen.
Ellison, N. (2006), The Transformation of Welfare States?, London and New York: Routledge.
Emmenegger, P., Ha¨usermann, S., Palier, B. and Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (eds.) (2012), The Age of
Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality of Deindustrializing Societies, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. (ed.) (1996), Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global
Economies, London: Sage.
Esping-Andersen, G. (2009), The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting to Women’s New Roles,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. and Myles, J. (2009), ‘Economic inequality and the welfare state’, in
W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic
Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 639–64.
Eurostat (2011a), ‘Employment rate by gender, age group 15–64’, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsiem010 (accessed: 31
May 2011).
Eurostat (2011b), ‘Average exit age from the labour force by gender’, http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsiem030&
language=en (accessed 31 May 2011).
Fajertag, G. and Pochet, P. (2000), Social Pacts in Europe: New Dynamics, Brussels: ETUI.
Ferrera, M. and Gualmini, E. (2000), ‘Italy: rescue from without?’, in F. W. Scharpf and
V. A. Schmidt (eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. II: Diverse Responses to
Common Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 351–98.
Ferrera, M. and Hemerijck, A. (2003), ‘Recalibrating Europe’s welfare regimes’, in J. Zeitlin
and D. M. Trubek (eds.), Governing Work and Welfare in the New Economy: European and
American Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88–128.
Gazier, B. (2008), ‘Flexicurite´ et marche´s transitionnels du travail: esquisse d’une re´flexion
normative’, Travail et Emploi, No. 113 (January–March), 117–28.
Gazier, B. (2009), ‘The European employment strategy in the tempest: restoring a long-term
perspective’, in N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (eds.), What Future for Social Investment?
Institute for Future StudiesResearchReport, Stockholm: Institute for Future Studies, pp. 153–
64.
Gilbert, N. (2004), Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public
Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hakim, C. (2003), Work−Lifestyle Choices in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ha¨usermann, S. (2010),ThePolitics ofWelfare StateReform inContinental Europe:Modernization
in Hard Times, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hemerijck, A. (2002), ‘The self-transformation of the European social model(s)’, in G. Esping-
Andersen, D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck and J. Myles (eds.), Why We Need a New Welfare State,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 173–213.
Hemerijck, A. (2003), ‘Vier kernvragen van beleid’, Beleid en Maatschappij, 30: 1, 3–19.
Hemerijck, A. and Schludi, M. (2000), ‘Sequences of policy failures and effective policy
responses’, in F. W. Scharpf and V. A. Schmidt (eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open
Economy, Vol. I: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 125–228.
two decades of change in europe 491
Hemerijck, A., Knapen, B. and van Doorne, E. (2009), Aftershocks: Economic Crisis and
Institutional Choice, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Hills, J., Sefton, T. and Stewart, K. (eds.) (2009),Towards aMoreEqual Society? Poverty, Inequality
and Policy since 1997, Bristol: Policy Press.
Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2001), Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and
Policies Global Markets, London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Immergut, E., Anderson, K. and Schulze, I. (eds.) (2007),TheOxfordHandbook ofWest European
Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jenson, J. (2006), ‘The European social model: gender and generational equality’, in A. Giddens,
P. Diamond and R. Liddle (eds.), Global Europe, Social Europe, Cambridge: Polity Press,
pp. 151–71.
Jenson, J. (2009), ‘Redesigning citizenship regimes after neoliberalism: moving towards social
investment’, in N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (eds.), What Future for Social Investment?
Stockholm: Institute for Future Studies, pp. 27–44.
Kvist, J., Pedersen, L. and Ko¨hler, P. (2008), ‘Making all persons work: modern active labour
market policies’, in W. Eichhorst, O. Kaufmann and R. Konle-Seidl (eds.), Bringing the
Jobless into Work? Experiences with Activation Schemes in Europe and the US, Berlin:
Springer, pp. 221–56.
Leibfried, S. and Mau, S. (2008), Welfare States: Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Madsen, P. K. (2006), ‘How can it possibly fly? The paradox of a dynamic labour market in a
Scandinavian welfare state’, in J. L. Campbell, J. A. Hall and O. K. Pedersen (eds.), National
Identity and Varieties of Capitalism: The Case of Denmark, Montreal: McGill University
Press, pp. 321–55.
Morel, N., Palier, B. and Palme, J. (2009), What Future for Social Investment?, Stockholm:
Institute for Future Studies.
Morgan, K. (2009), ‘Child care and the social investment model: political conditions for reform’,
in N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (eds.), What Future for Social Investment?, Stockholm:
Institute for Future Studies, pp. 45–54.
Nachtwey, O. and Heise, A. (2006), ‘Großbritannien: Vom kranken Mann Europas zum
Wirtschaftswunderland?’, WSI-Mitteilungen, 3: 131–7.
Obinger, H. and Starke, P. (2007), ‘Sozialpolitische Entwicklungstrends in OECD-La¨ndern
1980–2001: Konvergenz, Divergenz oder Persistenz?’, special issue ‘Transfer, Diffusion und
Konvergenz von Politiken’, edited by K. Holzinger, H. Jo¨rgens and C. Knill, Politische
Vierteljahresschrift, pp. 470–95.
OECD (2008), Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, Paris:
OECD.
OECD (2010), Employment Outlook 2010: Moving beyond the Jobs Crisis, Paris: OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_2649_33927_43221014_1_1_1_1,00.html#
taxes.
Orloff, A. S. (2006), ‘From maternalism to “Employment for All”: state policies to promote
women’s employment across the affluent democracies’, in J. Levy (ed.), The State after
Statism: New State Activities in the Era of Globalization and Liberalization, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 230–68.
Page, R. and Hillage, J. (2006), ‘Vocational education and training in the UK’, Discussion Paper,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Socialforschung, January 2006.
Palier, B. (ed.) (2010), A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? The Politics ofWelfare Reform in Continental
Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Pierson, P. (ed.) (2001), The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rauch, A. and Dornette, J. (2010), ‘Equal rights and equal duties? Activating labour market
policy and the participation of long-term unemployed people with disabilities after the
reform of the German welfare state’, Journal of Social Policy, 39: 1, 53–70.
Ryner, M. (2007), ‘The Nordic model: does it exist? Can it survive?’, New Political Economy, 12:
1, 61–70.
492 kees van kersbergen and anton hemerijck
Scharpf, F. W. and Schmidt, V. A. (2000), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, 2 Volumes,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Starke, P. (2008), Radical Welfare State Retrenchment: A Comparative Analysis, Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stiller, S. (2010), Ideational Leadership inGermanWelfare State Reform, Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press.
Van Berkel, R. (2010), ‘The provision of income protection and activation services for the
unemployed in “active” welfare states: an international comparison’, Journal of Social
Policy, 39: 1, 17–34.
Van Kersbergen, K. (1995), Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare
State, London/New York: Routledge.
Vis, B. (2010),Politics of Risk-Taking:Welfare StateReform inAdvancedDemocracies, Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Vis, B. and van Kersbergen, K. (2011), ‘To what extent did the financial crisis intensify the
pressure to reform the welfare state?’, Social Policy and Administration, 45: 4, 338–53.
Visser, J. and Hemerijck, A. (1997),ADutchMiracle: JobGrowth,WelfareReformandCorporatism
in the Netherlands, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Weishaupt, J. T. (2010), From the Manpower Revolution to the Activation Paradigm: Explaining
Institutional Continuity and Change in an Integrating Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press.
